David Chalmers - Reality+
In the coming decades, the technology that enables virtual and augmented reality will improve beyond recognition. Within a century, world-renowned philosopher David J. Chalmers predicts, we will have virtual worlds that are impossible to distinguish from non-virtual worlds. But is virtual reality just escapism?
In a highly original work of 'technophilosophy', Chalmers argues categorically, no: virtual reality is genuine reality. Virtual worlds are not second-class worlds. We can live a meaningful life in virtual reality - and increasingly, we will.
What is reality, anyway? How can we lead a good life? Is there a god? How do we know there's an external world - and how do we know we're not living in a computer simulation? In Reality+, Chalmers conducts a grand tour of philosophy, using cutting-edge technology to provide invigorating new answers to age-old questions.
David J. Chalmers is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in the areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He is Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science at New York University, as well as co-director of NYU's Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness. Chalmers is best known for his work on consciousness, including his formulation of the "hard problem of consciousness."
Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy
https://amzn.to/3RYyGD2
https://consc.net/
https://x.com/davidchalmers42
00:00:00 Reality+ Intro
00:12:02 GPT conscious? 10/10
00:14:19 The consciousness processor thought experiment (11/10)
00:20:34 Intelligence and Consciousness entangled? 10/10
00:22:44 Karl Friston / Meta Problem 10/10
00:29:05 Knowledge argument / subjective experience (6/10)
00:32:34 Emergence 11/10 (best chapter)
00:42:45 Working with Douglas Hofstadter 10/10
00:46:14 Intelligence is analogy making? 10/10
00:50:47 Intelligence explosion 8/10
00:58:44 Hypercomputation 10/10
01:09:44 Who designed the designer? (7/10)
01:13:57 Experience machine (7/10)
(Music Removed) #90 - Prof. DAVID CHALMERS - Consciousness in LLMs [Special Edition]
Support us! https://www.patreon.com/mlst
(On the main version we released; the music was a tiny bit too loud in places, and some pieces had percussion which was a bit distracting -- here is a version with all music removed so you have the option! )
David Chalmers is a professor of philosophy and neural science at New York University, and an honorary professor of philosophy at the Australian National University. He is the co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness, as well as the PhilPapers Foundation. His research focuses on the philosophy of mind, especially consciousness, and its connection to fields such as cognitive science, physics, and technology. He also investigates areas such as the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. With his impressive breadth of knowledge and experience, David Chalmers is a leader in the philosophical community.
The central challenge for consciousness studies is to explain how something immaterial, subjective, and personal can arise out of something material, objective, and impersonal. This is illustrated by the example of a bat, whose sensory experience is much different from ours, making it difficult to imagine what it's like to be one. Thomas Nagel's "inconceivability argument" has its advantages and disadvantages, but ultimately it is impossible to solve the mind-body problem due to the subjective nature of experience. This is further explored by examining the concept of philosophical zombies, which are physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from conscious humans yet lack conscious experience. This has implications for the Hard Problem of Consciousness, which is the attempt to explain how mental states are linked to neurophysiological activity. The Chinese Room Argument is used as a thought experiment to explain why physicality may be insufficient to be the source of the subjective, coherent experience we call consciousness. Despite much debate, the Hard Problem of Consciousness remains unsolved. Chalmers has been working on a functional approach to decide whether large language models are, or could be conscious.
Filmed at #neurips22
Discord: https://discord.gg/aNPkGUQtc5
Pod: https://anchor.fm/machinelearningstreettalk/episodes/90---Prof--DAVID-CHALMERS---Slightly-Conscious-LLMs-e1sej50
TOC;
[00:00:00] Introduction
[00:00:40] LLMs consciousness pitch
[00:06:33] Philosophical Zombies
[00:09:26] The hard problem of consciousness
[00:11:40] Nagal's bat and intelligibility
[00:21:04] LLM intro clip from NeurIPS
[00:22:55] Connor Leahy on self-awareness in LLMs
[00:23:30] Sneak peek from unreleased show - could consciousness be a submodule?
[00:33:44] SeppH
[00:36:15] Tim interviews David at NeurIPS (functionalism / panpsychism / Searle)
[00:45:20] Peter Hase interviews Chalmers (focus on interpretability/safety)
Panel:
Dr. Tim Scarfe
Dr. Keith Duggar
Contact David;
https://mobile.twitter.com/davidchalmers42
https://consc.net/
References;
Could a Large Language Model Be Conscious? [Chalmers NeurIPS22 talk]
https://nips.cc/media/neurips-2022/Slides/55867.pdf
What Is It Like to Be a Bat? [Nagel]
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/iatl/study/ugmodules/humananimalstudies/lectures/32/nagel_bat.pdf
Zombies
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
zombies on the web [Chalmers]
https://consc.net/zombies-on-the-web/
The hard problem of consciousness [Chalmers]
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2007-00485-017
David Chalmers, "Are Large Language Models Sentient?" [NYU talk, same as at NeurIPS]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BcuCmf00_Y
#90 - Prof. DAVID CHALMERS - Consciousness in LLMs [Special Edition]
Support us! https://www.patreon.com/mlst
David Chalmers is a professor of philosophy and neural science at New York University, and an honorary professor of philosophy at the Australian National University. He is the co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness, as well as the PhilPapers Foundation. His research focuses on the philosophy of mind, especially consciousness, and its connection to fields such as cognitive science, physics, and technology. He also investigates areas such as the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. With his impressive breadth of knowledge and experience, David Chalmers is a leader in the philosophical community.
The central challenge for consciousness studies is to explain how something immaterial, subjective, and personal can arise out of something material, objective, and impersonal. This is illustrated by the example of a bat, whose sensory experience is much different from ours, making it difficult to imagine what it's like to be one. Thomas Nagel's "inconceivability argument" has its advantages and disadvantages, but ultimately it is impossible to solve the mind-body problem due to the subjective nature of experience. This is further explored by examining the concept of philosophical zombies, which are physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from conscious humans yet lack conscious experience. This has implications for the Hard Problem of Consciousness, which is the attempt to explain how mental states are linked to neurophysiological activity. The Chinese Room Argument is used as a thought experiment to explain why physicality may be insufficient to be the source of the subjective, coherent experience we call consciousness. Despite much debate, the Hard Problem of Consciousness remains unsolved. Chalmers has been working on a functional approach to decide whether large language models are, or could be conscious.
Filmed at #neurips22
Discord: https://discord.gg/aNPkGUQtc5
YT: https://youtu.be/T7aIxncLuWk
TOC;
[00:00:00] Introduction
[00:00:40] LLMs consciousness pitch
[00:06:33] Philosophical Zombies
[00:09:26] The hard problem of consciousness
[00:11:40] Nagal's bat and intelligibility
[00:21:04] LLM intro clip from NeurIPS
[00:22:55] Connor Leahy on self-awareness in LLMs
[00:23:30] Sneak peek from unreleased show - could consciousness be a submodule?
[00:33:44] SeppH
[00:36:15] Tim interviews David at NeurIPS (functionalism / panpsychism / Searle)
[00:45:20] Peter Hase interviews Chalmers (focus on interpretability/safety)
Panel:
Dr. Tim Scarfe
Dr. Keith Duggar
Contact David;
https://mobile.twitter.com/davidchalmers42
https://consc.net/
References;
Could a Large Language Model Be Conscious? [Chalmers NeurIPS22 talk]
https://nips.cc/media/neurips-2022/Slides/55867.pdf
What Is It Like to Be a Bat? [Nagel]
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/iatl/study/ugmodules/humananimalstudies/lectures/32/nagel_bat.pdf
Zombies
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
zombies on the web [Chalmers]
https://consc.net/zombies-on-the-web/
The hard problem of consciousness [Chalmers]
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2007-00485-017
David Chalmers, "Are Large Language Models Sentient?" [NYU talk, same as at NeurIPS]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BcuCmf00_Y
#79 Consciousness and the Chinese Room [Special Edition] (CHOLLET, BISHOP, CHALMERS, BACH)
This video is demonetised on music copyright so we would appreciate support on our Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/mlst
We would also appreciate it if you rated us on your podcast platform.
YT: https://youtu.be/_KVAzAzO5HU
Panel: Dr. Tim Scarfe, Dr. Keith Duggar
Guests: Prof. J. Mark Bishop, Francois Chollet, Prof. David Chalmers, Dr. Joscha Bach, Prof. Karl Friston, Alexander Mattick, Sam Roffey
The Chinese Room Argument was first proposed by philosopher John Searle in 1980. It is an argument against the possibility of artificial intelligence (AI) – that is, the idea that a machine could ever be truly intelligent, as opposed to just imitating intelligence.
The argument goes like this:
Imagine a room in which a person sits at a desk, with a book of rules in front of them. This person does not understand Chinese.
Someone outside the room passes a piece of paper through a slot in the door. On this paper is a Chinese character. The person in the room consults the book of rules and, following these rules, writes down another Chinese character and passes it back out through the slot.
To someone outside the room, it appears that the person in the room is engaging in a conversation in Chinese. In reality, they have no idea what they are doing – they are just following the rules in the book.
The Chinese Room Argument is an argument against the idea that a machine could ever be truly intelligent. It is based on the idea that intelligence requires understanding, and that following rules is not the same as understanding.
in this detailed investigation into the Chinese Room, Consciousness and Syntax vs Semantics, we interview luminaries J.Mark Bishop and Francois Chollet and use unreleased footage from our interviews with David Chalmers, Joscha Bach and Karl Friston. We also cover material from Walid Saba and interview Alex Mattick from Yannic's Discord.
This is probably my favourite ever episode of MLST. I hope you enjoy it! With Keith Duggar.
Note that we are using clips from our unreleased interviews from David Chalmers and Joscha Bach -- we will release those shows properly in the coming weeks. We apologise for delay releasing our backlog, we have been busy building a startup company in the background.
TOC:
[00:00:00] Kick off
[00:00:46] Searle
[00:05:09] Bishop introduces CRA
[00:00:00] Stevan Hardad take on CRA
[00:14:03] Francois Chollet dissects CRA
[00:34:16] Chalmers on consciousness
[00:36:27] Joscha Bach on consciousness
[00:42:01] Bishop introduction
[00:51:51] Karl Friston on consciousness
[00:55:19] Bishop on consciousness and comments on Chalmers
[01:21:37] Private language games (including clip with Sam Roffey)
[01:27:27] Dr. Walid Saba on the chinese room (gofai/systematicity take)
[00:34:36] Bishop: on agency / teleology
[01:36:38] Bishop: back to CRA
[01:40:53] Noam Chomsky on mysteries
[01:45:56] Eric Curiel on math does not represent
[01:48:14] Alexander Mattick on syntax vs semantics
Thanks to: Mark MC on Discord for stimulating conversation, Alexander Mattick, Dr. Keith Duggar, Sam Roffey. Sam's YouTube channel is https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjRNMsglFYFwNsnOWIOgt1Q
David Chalmers: The Hard Problem of Consciousness
David Chalmers is a philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and consciousness. He is perhaps best known for formulating the hard problem of consciousness which could be stated as “why does the feeling which accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?”
This conversation is part of the Artificial Intelligence podcast. If you would like to get more information about this podcast go to https://lexfridman.com/ai or connect with @lexfridman on Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, Medium, or YouTube where you can watch the video versions of these conversations. If you enjoy the podcast, please rate it 5 stars on Apple Podcasts, follow on Spotify, or support it on Patreon.
This episode is presented by Cash App. Download it (App Store, Google Play), use code “LexPodcast”.
Here’s the outline of the episode. On some podcast players you should be able to click the timestamp to jump to that time.
00:00 – Introduction
02:23 – Nature of reality: Are we living in a simulation?
19:19 – Consciousness in virtual reality
27:46 – Music-color synesthesia
31:40 – What is consciousness?
51:25 – Consciousness and the meaning of life
57:33 – Philosophical zombies
1:01:38 – Creating the illusion of consciousness
1:07:03 – Conversation with a clone
1:11:35 – Free will
1:16:35 – Meta-problem of consciousness
1:18:40 – Is reality an illusion?
1:20:53 – Descartes’ evil demon
1:23:20 – Does AGI need conscioussness?
1:33:47 – Exciting future
1:35:32 – Immortality
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